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Despite what mainstream economists preach, currency-issuing central governments have no 
budget  constraint.  It  is  therefore  incumbent  upon  them  to  use their unique spending and 
taxing powers to achieve the broader goal of sustainable development. Their failure to do so 
has meant that nations have fallen well short of realising their full potential. Rather than 
accept the neo-liberal myth that „small government is best‟, the citizens of a nation should 
welcome  the  central-government‟s  responsible  use  of  their  unique  spending  and  taxing 
powers to provide sufficient public goods and critical infrastructure, achieve and maintain full 
employment, resolve critical social and environmental concerns, and meet the requirements of 
an aging population. Should central governments fail in their responsibility to prudently use 
their unique powers, public disapproval is best registered through the ballot box, not through 




The  mainstream  view  of  currency-issuing  central  governments  is  that  they  are  budget-
constrained like any other entity in the economy (Barro, 1993). Hence, in order to spend, it is 
claimed that central governments must earn revenue by levying taxes and selling publicly-
provided goods and services. Moreover, should spending exceed revenue (a budget deficit), it 
is argued that central governments must either borrow from the private sector by issuing 
government securities, sell public assets through a privatisation process, or, if possible, call 
upon  funds  acquired  from  previous  budget  surpluses.  Furthermore,  because  mainstream 
economists believe that central governments compete with the private sector and other levels 
of government for limited funds, it is also contended that deficit-spending leads to higher 
interest  rates  which,  by  crowding  out  private-sector  investment,  generates  no  appreciable   2 
increase in national output (Gans et al., 2009). Finally, mainstream economists argue that 
budget deficits reduce the future spending power of central governments which undermines 
their capacity to provide public goods and meet the future needs of an aging population. 
  In consequence, mainstream macroeconomists have long been recommending that central 
governments  should,  on  average, operate small budget  surpluses  over the business  cycle. 
This, they believe, will boost national savings, relieve inflationary and interest rate pressures, 
and  provide  the  room  and  stability  to  facilitate  and  promote  a  thriving  private  sector 
(McTaggart et al., 2006). They also believe it will enable central governments to store away 
the  funds  needed  to  cope  with  the  budgetary  requirements  of  an  aging  population 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2010). With respect to this later issue, mainstream economists 
have also called upon central governments to promote superannuation in the belief that self-
funded retirement will both reduce the future tax impost on the working population and leave 
central governments with more spending power to address other pressing concerns. 
  By  embracing  modern  monetary  theory
1,  I  aim  to  demonstrate  that  these  mainstream 
claims are false. Currency-issuing central governments have no budget constraint and their 
failure to fully exploit their unique spending and taxing powers for public purposes has meant 
that nations have fallen well short of realising their full potential. Worse still, many countries 
are now precariously positioned with regards to achieving the triple-pillar goals of ecological 
sustainability,  distributional  equity,  and  allocative  efficiency  that  ecological  economists 
believe  are  necessary  to  achieve  the  broader  goal  of  sustainable  development,  otherwise 
known as sustainable qualitative improvement (Daly, 1992; Lawn, 2007). 
  In  order  to  achieve  my  aims,  I  will  begin  by  explaining  why  currency-issuing  central 
governments have effectively unlimited spending power. I will then look closely at central-
government spending and why, despite having no budget constraint, central governments are 
required to tax the private sector. Having done this, I will explain the real reason behind 
central  banks  having  to  issue  bonds  in  response  to  a  central-government  deficit.  In  the 
process,  I  will  debunk  the  mainstream  view  that  central-government  deficits  discourage 
private-sector investment by exerting upward pressure on interest rates. Continuing on with a 
similar theme, I will then focus on the effect that central-government budgets have on private-
sector net savings. The implications of central-government budgets on international trade and 
the productive capacity of nations will also be explored. 
Having outlined the basics of modern monetary theory, I will then proceed to discuss some 
of its broader implications. The areas covered include: the macroallocation of resources – that   3 
is, what proportion of the incoming resource flow should be allocated to the private and 
public sectors of the economy; how full employment can be achieved in a non-inflationary 
and  ecologically  sustainable  manner;  the  implications  of  inflation-control  for  the  central-
government budget position; how taxation, given the macroeconomic need for it, can be used 
as a policy instrument; what is the most appropriate means of controlling inflation at the 
margin;  and  the  relationship  between  central-government  budgets,  sustainable  productive 
capacity, and an aging population. It is my hope that, by raising these areas of concern, this 
paper can assist in overturning the false underestimation of the role that central governments 
can play in achieving the goal of sustainable development. 
 
2. Currency-issuing central governments have no budget constraint 
Imagine that I, as an Australian citizen, have performed an extraordinary deed for my country. 
To reward my efforts, the Australian Federal Government takes the unprecedented step of 
granting me three unique means of financing my spending. In the first instance, it provides me 
with a printing press that enables me to produce as many Australian $100 notes I like and 
spend them into existence. Secondly, it provides me with an open cheque-book that allows 
me to write cheques to whatever value I like and spend them into existence. The cheques 
never bounce. If I exhaust my cheque-book, I immediately receive a replacement. Finally, I 
am given a bottomless, plastic swipe card that enables me to conduct electronic transactions 
to whatever value I like. The transactions are always accepted as payment. Following an 
electronic purchase, the balance appearing on the seller‟s bank account rises by the value of 
the transaction. 
  Now, answer this question: Would I have any need to earn money, borrow money, tap into 
my savings,  or sell some of my existing assets  to  finance my spending? The answer, of 
course, is no. My spending power would effectively be unlimited.
2 Moreover, my spending 
power would bear no relation to my financial circumstances prior to being rewarded in the 
above manner. Irrespective of whether I previously possessed net financial assets worth $1 
million or net liabilities of $1 million, my capacity to spend would be exactly the same. If I 
was in the latter position, all I would have to do  vis-à-vis the former position is write myself 
an additional cheque to the value of $2 million. 
  What‟s the relevance of this? Although somewhat simplified, this is precisely the same 
privileged  position  enjoyed  by  every  currency-issuing  central  government.
3  Central 
governments  have  no  need  to  „earn‟  revenue,  „borrow‟  funds,  or  sell  assets  through  a   4 
privatisation process to finance their spending.
4 Nor is their capacity to spend affected in any 
way by whether they are operating a budget surplus or deficit. In sum, modern monetary 
theory reveals that currency-issuing central governments have no budget constraint despite 
what you read in virtually every macroeconomics textbook.
5 
  Interestingly, whenever I pose this question to an audience, I typically get an answer like, 
“Yes, but taking advantage of this privileged position would be hyper-inflationary and lead to 
outrageously high interest rates”. I‟ll say more about the macroeconomic effects of central-
government spending and taxation shortly, but this is an answer to a different question. When 
forced  to  deal  only  with  the  question  asked  above,  no  mainstream  economist  is  able  to 
demonstrate  that  a  currency-issuing  central  government  is  budget-constrained.  Some 
economists revert to the budget-constraining logic of a gold standard when exchange rates 
were fixed and a nation‟s currency was convertible into a commodity of intrinsic value. But 
these  circumstances  are  irrelevant  in  a  contemporary,  fiat-currency  world  dominated  by 
flexible exchange rates. On some occasions, I get a response, such as, “Off the top of my 
head, I can‟t explain why a central government is budget-constrained, but there is something 
wrong with this reasoning somewhere. I‟d need a bit more time to think about it.” Given how 
fundamental  the  concept  of  a  central-government  budget  constraint  is  to  the  mainstream 
macroeconomic  framework,  this  constitutes  an  extraordinarily  insipid  explanation  from 
anyone claiming to be a competent economist. In actual fact, it says more about the false 
perceptions of public finance and the unwillingness of many economists to abandon them. 
  Being free of a budget constraint does not mean that a currency-issuing central government 
can  spend  irresponsibly  or  recklessly.  Nor  does  it  mean  that  a  currency-issuing  central 
government has no need to impose taxes on the private sector. No, furthermore, does it mean 
that it has no need to issue government securities if operating a budget deficit. As I will soon 
explain, central-government taxation serves as a means by which a currency-issuing central 
government can destroy private-sector spending power. Although taxation can and should be 
used  as  a  policy  instrument,  its  primary  macroeconomic  purpose  is  to  enable  a  central 
government to nullify the inflationary impact of its own spending. As for bond issuance, it is 
needed to enable central banks to conduct monetary policy on behalf of central governments. 
For reasons already given, bond issuance is never needed to finance a budget shortfall. 
Because there is such a thing as responsible central-government spending and taxation, 
one  might  ask  why  there  is  any  purpose  in  highlighting  that  currency-issuing  central 
governments are not budget-constrained. After all, if a currency-issuing central government   5 
can never fully exploit its unlimited spending power, what benefit is there in having it? The 
benefit exists in the sense that once a central government has imposed the taxation required to 
quell the inflationary effect of its own spending, it matters none whether it is operating a 
budget  surplus  or  deficit.  The  prevailing  budget  position  has  no  bearing  on  central-
government „debt‟, which never technically exists; has no bearing on a central government‟s 
capacity to spend in the future; and has no bearing on the tax burden of future generations, 
except  that  the  current  budget  stance  might  affect  the  future  productive  capacity  of  the 
nation‟s economy, which, in turn, can alter the amount of private-sector spending that must be 
destroyed to quell the inflationary effect of future central-government spending. I will return 
to this latter point in my discussion on the intergenerational debate. 
I  might  add  that,  beyond  this  section  of  the  paper,  I  will  be  referring  to  central 
governments only. State/provincial and local governments are different in that they are not the 
issuer  of  the  nation‟s  currency.  Hence  they,  like  households  and  firms,  are  budget-
constrained. Quite clearly, a currency-issuing central government is a unique entity within any 
national  economy.  Exceptions  include  central  governments  which  have  thoughtlessly 
relinquished monopoly ownership of the nation‟s currency in order to be part of a regional 
currency. A good example of this is the European Union (EU) and the Euro. 
Before moving on, state/provincial and local government budget deficits need not be a 
concern if the size of the deficit poses no threat to the broader national economy. In some 
cases, and because non-central governments can be more responsive to local needs, a non-
central-government deficit can serve as a more effective means of carrying out the public 
spending  that  would  otherwise  be  part  of  a  larger  central-government  deficit.  In  other 
instances,  non-central  governments  are  constitutionally  responsible  for  delivering  specific 
government services. To provide such services at the desired level, it may be necessary for 
non-central governments to go into deficit. Non-central government deficits need never be a 
funding concern because a currency-issuing central government can always bankroll them in 
the same way they bankroll the deficits of millions of citizens (e.g., recipients of welfare 
payments).  To  prevent  state/provincial  and  local  government  budget  deficits  from 
destabilising the national economy, a central and a non-central government can always come 
to a suitable funding arrangement, such as the former promising to bankroll the latter‟s deficit 
so long as the latter keeps the deficit within an agreed limit. 
   6 
3. Why do currency-issuing central governments spend and tax the private sector? 
There  are  many  reasons  why  currency-issuing  central  governments  create  „money‟  for 
themselves and spend it into existence. In a nutshell, central-government spending is required 
to  transfer resources  from  the private to  the public sector, thus enabling it to supply the 
physical goods that society desires but which the private sector does not provide in sufficient 
quantities. In other words, central-government spending is required to supply physical goods 
with public goods characteristics.
6 This includes some of the critical infrastructure needed to 
maintain a nation‟s productive capacity. In some cases, central governments may provide 
goods that citizens do not desire but which governments believe are in their best interest to 
consume  (merit  goods).  Central-government  spending  is  also  needed  to  allow  central 
governments to own, maintain, and operate natural monopolies; to establish and resource 
government  bureaucracies;  to  maintain  law  and  order;  to  meet  the  nation‟s  military 
requirements; and to define and protect private property rights. 
  There are three further reasons for central-government spending. The first is to provide 
spending power for welfare recipients. The second is to supply the net financial assets that the 
private  sector  requires  to  satisfy  its  savings  desires.  The  third,  which  has  largely  been 
abandoned since the 1970s, is to ensure full employment, which central governments can 
achieve by bridging the gap between the actual and full-employment levels of national output. 
There is an urgent need for central governments to reinstate full employment as an economic 
and social policy. I will later outline a means by which this can be achieved in an efficient, 
ecologically sustainable, and non-inflationary manner. 
In  the  process  of  spending  money  into  existence  to  achieve  the  above  goals,  central 
governments create the spending power they require to access natural resources (the true input 
of  the  economic  process),  capital  and  labour  (the  resource-transforming  agents  of  the 
economic  process),  and  final  goods  and  services.  Imagine,  therefore,  a  situation  where  a 
central government, aware that it need not raise revenue to finance its spending, elected not to 
tax the private sector. A significant problem would immediately arise. This is because, firstly, 
central-government  spending  involves  having  to  compete  with  the  private  sector  for 
resources,  capital,  labour,  and  final  goods  and  services.  Secondly,  central-government 
spending constitutes a significant proportion of total national expenditure. Clearly, in these 
circumstances, central-government spending would be inflationary. 
Given  a  particular  interest  rate  setting,  how  does  a  central  government  quell  the 
inflationary impact of its own spending? That is, how does it reduce the inflationary pressure   7 
of its own spending to an acceptable rate – say, 2-3% per annum? Quite simply, it provides 
„spending room‟ for itself by destroying some private-sector spending power. How does it do 
this? It taxes the private sector. Thus, central-government taxation constitutes an essential 
inflation-quelling device. Indeed, from a macroeconomic perspective, it exists as little else. 
Of  course,  central  governments  do  not  act  in  this  way  –  they  act  as  if  they  are  budget-
constrained. But  as  much as  they levy taxes  in  the belief that tax revenue finances their 
spending, what they are really doing is inadvertently quelling the inflationary impact of their 
own spending, albeit they do it imperfectly on most occasions. 
Many economists have difficulty accepting the idea that taxation serves to destroy private-
sector spending power. I find this puzzling. Consult any macroeconomics textbook and you 
will always find a reference to taxation as an „automatic stabiliser‟. Taxes tied to income and 
expenditure levels are labelled automatic stabilisers because, in boom times, tax „revenue‟ 
rises, whilst in a recession, tax „revenue‟ diminishes. This helps to automatically smooth out 
or stabilise the boom-bust business cycle. But stabilisation is not achieved because of any rise 
and  fall  in  central-government  revenue,  but  because,  in  boom  times,  taxes  destroy  more 
private-sector sending power than in a recession.  
Some economists respond by saying that the extra tax „revenue‟ accumulated during boom 
times provides the central government with the financial wherewithal to increase spending 
during a recession without the need to boost taxation levels. In other words, it is the fiscal 
capacity to spend countercyclically that underpins the stabilisation role of taxation. This isn‟t 
so. To begin with, the additional tax „revenue‟ raised during boom times is no real increase in 
revenue at all, since it does not augment a central government‟s spending power. Secondly, 
the ability to increase spending without having to raise taxes during a recession indicates that, 
with private-sector spending weak, the level of taxation required to quell the inflationary 
impact of central-government spending is much less than in boom times. 
 
4. Central-government budgets and interest rates 
Mainstream models of money markets are based on the assumption that interest rates are a 
function  of  interacting  money  supply  and  money  demand  forces.  In  such  models,  it  is 
assumed that individuals have the option of possessing two kinds of financial assets – bonds 
offered for sale by the central government or non-interest bearing cash. It is further assumed 
that  bonds  yield  a  fixed  annual  payment  and  that  the  effective  interest  rate  on  bonds  is 
inversely  related  to  their  purchase  price.  For  example,  if  a  bond  yielding  a  $100  annual   8 
payment is priced at $1,000, the effective interest rate on the bond is 10% per annum. If the 
same bond is later sold for $2,000, the effective interest rate falls to 5% per annum. 
  Clearly, the lower is the price of bonds (i.e., the higher is the effective interest rate), the 
greater is the opportunity cost of holding non-interest bearing cash. Thus, ceteris paribus, as 
the effective interest rate on bonds rises, the quantity of money or cash demanded declines. 
With this in mind, mainstream economists claim that if a central bank purchases government 
bonds from the private sector to increase the money supply, the equilibrium interest rate will 
fall. This is because, at the previous interest rate, the larger money supply will exceed the 
demand for money. In order for both to equate, the demand for money must rise. For this to 
occur,  the  effective  interest  rate  on  bonds  must  decline,  which  it  does  as  the  central-
government purchase of bonds increases bond prices. 
  It is from this view of interest rate determination that mainstream economists argue that 
central-government  deficits  place  upward  pressure  on  interest  rates.  They  contend  that 
central-government spending in excess of taxation requires the central government to sell 
bonds to „finance‟ the budget shortfall. With the money supply unchanged (money injection 
equals money extraction) and the private-sector‟s transaction demand for money now greater, 
it is contended that the interest rate must rise until the demand for money and the money 
supply again equilibrate. At the going equilibrium price level, this reduces or „crowds out‟ 
private-sector investment, thus resulting in a smaller increase in aggregate spending than that 
initially undertaken by the central government. Provided the equilibrium national output is 
less than the potential output level, national output rises. But, in doing so, the price level 
increases, thereby reducing the real money supply. This leads to a further increase in the 
interest  rate,  a  further  crowding  out  of  private-sector  investment,  and  a  decline  in  the 
equilibrium national output level. Overall, the increase in national output is much less than 
the  initial  boost  in  central-government  spending.  With  the  central  government‟s  future 
capacity to spend supposedly undermined by the need to repay a larger public debt, many 
mainstream economists question the social benefit of deficit-spending in all but exceptional 
circumstances. 
  The most significant problem with this mainstream reasoning is that it omits the most 
influential interest rate variable and the operating factors affecting it. The critical variable is 
the short-term interest rate or the interest rate charged on funds loaned overnight – often 
referred to as the overnight cash rate.
7 That the overnight cash rate is the most influential 
interest rate variable is evidenced by the fact that, when conducting monetary policy on behalf   9 
of central governments, almost all central banks seek to maintain a specifically targeted cash 
rate. Central banks do not target bond prices, which is what we would expect if the bond price 
constituted the most important determinant of interest rates. 
How, then, does a central-government budget deficit affect the overnight cash rate? Before 
this question can be answered, a few details need to be outlined. Firstly, the cash rate is not 
set  in  stone by a central bank. The cash rate always remains free to rise and fall as per 
changing market forces. Thus, to keep the cash rate at the target level, a central bank must 
manipulate market forces by engaging in open market operations (i.e., the buying and selling 
of government securities). 
Secondly, in addition to setting an overnight cash rate, the central bank also sets a support 
rate which it pays on commercial bank reserves held with the central bank. In many countries, 
the support or default rate on surplus funds is something less than the overnight rate. For 
example, the Reserve Bank of Australia pays a default rate equal to 0.25% less than the target 
cash rate. In some countries, however, the default rate is zero, meaning that any funds left 
overnight with the central bank earn no interest income. Importantly, the default rate serves as 
the interest rate floor for the entire economy. 
Thirdly, because a budget deficit involves an injection of more spending power than that 
destroyed by taxation, a budget deficit involves a net injection of spending power into the 
national  economy.  A  budget  deficit  ultimately  manifests  itself  as  excess  reserves  in  the 
clearing balances of a nation‟s commercial banks at the central bank (Mitchell and Muysken, 
2008).  
Given  the  above,  and  since  commercial  banks  are  profit-seeking  entities,  commercial 
banks will endeavour to offload excess funds at market rates rather than earn interest income 
at  the  lower  default  rate.  Competition  between  the  banks  to  offload  excess  funds  exerts 
downward pressure on the overnight cash rate. Since the overnight cash rate is the most 
influential interest rate variable, and given that a central government‟s fiscal stance has the 
greatest impact on the nation‟s cash rate, it is abundantly clear that budget deficits exert 
downward pressure on interest rates. This is precisely opposite to conventional wisdom, and 
is in part evidenced by a cash rate in the USA that is only marginally above 0% at present 
despite the US Federal Government running the largest budget deficits as a percentage of 
GDP since World War 2 (Fullwiler and Wray, 2010). 
Of course, this still leaves open the question as to how a central bank defends the target 
cash rate when the central government operates a budget deficit. It does so by draining excess   10 
liquidity (excess reserves), which it accomplishes by selling government bonds. Hence, rather 
than financing a budget shortfall, the sale of government securities serves to maintain the 
target cash rate when the central government is operating a budget deficit.
8 
Importantly, the funds used to purchase the government securities come from the net 
government spending accompanying the central government‟s budget deficit (Nugent, 2003). 
Consequently, any notion that increased central-government spending leads to a rationing of 
finite  savings  that  would  otherwise  be  used  for  private-sector  investment  purposes  (e.g., 
DeLong, 2002) is false. This, along with the fact that budgets deficits do not lead to higher 
interest rates, indicates that budgets deficits do not crowd out private-sector investment. 
It is true that undesirable inflationary pressures induced by taxation levels insufficient to 
quell the inflationary impact of a central government‟s own spending can force a central bank 
to reduce private-sector demand, which it can do by raising the target cash rate. However, this 
would constitute an artificial rise in interest rates, since the natural pressure on the cash rate 
would  still  be  downward.  It  would  also  constitute  an  example  of  excessive  government 
spending, the possibility of which I referred to earlier. It would not be a case of budget 
deficits  per  se  exerting  upward  pressure  on  interest  rates.  Given,  therefore,  the  lack  of 
inflationary pressure and a cash rate of little more than 0% in the USA, it is clear that the 
huge budget deficits currently being operated by the US Federal Government are in no way 
excessive or „irresponsible‟. 
 
5. Central-government budgets, private-sector net savings, and international trade 
To  further  investigate  the  role  and  implications  of  a  central-government  budget,  the 
macroeconomy can be divided into two main sectors – a consolidated central-government 
sector,  which  includes  the  central  government,  the  central  bank,  and  treasury;  and  a 
consolidated non-central government sector, which includes the domestic private sector and 
the  foreign  sector.
9  This division of sectors is re presented by the following accounting 
identity found in every macroeconomics textbook: 
 
    (G – T) = (S – I) – (X – M)                                     (1) 
 
where G = central-government spending; T = central-government taxation; S = private-sector 
savings; I = private-sector investment; X = exports; and M = imports.   11 
  Importantly, the consolidated private sector depicted in the right-hand side of equation (1) 
must  equal  the  central-government  budget  position  depicted  in  the  left-hand  side  of  the 
equation. If we assume that next exports (X – M) equal zero, net private savings must equal 
the central-government budget. Hence, irrespective of the private sector‟s net savings desires, 
a central-government deficit would, under these circumstances, translate dollar-for-dollar into 
a rise in net private savings. Conversely, a central-government surplus would translate into a 
decline in net private savings. The reason for this is simple – only a currency-issuing central 
government can create net financial assets, which it can only do via deficit-spending (Mitchell 
and Muysken, 2008). The same also holds for the destructive impact of a budget surplus on 
net financial assets. Private-sector financial institutions can also create financial assets, but 
they are always matched by an equal and offsetting financial liability. No net financial assets 
can ever be created or destroyed by the private sector. 
  In reality, next exports are unlikely to be zero. Consequently, a central-government deficit 
will not always translate into positive net private savings, let alone into net private savings on 
a  dollar-for-dollar  basis.  Depending  on  the  size  of,  and  sign  on,  net  exports,  it  is  quite 
conceivable for net private savings to be positive when a central government is operating a 
budget surplus.
10 However, for this to continue, it is necessary for net exports to remain 
positive. This is all well and good except that it involves the citizens of a nation having to 
relinquish more useful products to foreigners than vice versa to obtain the additional financial 
assets desired.
11  Moreover, it relies on foreign governments continuously running budget 
deficits or foreigners going increasingly into debt to finance their import spending.
12 Whilst 
the former is sustainable, the latter is not. Furthermore, the desire  of foreigners to run down 
their net savings can suddenly halt, as can the desire of foreign governments to keep running 
budget deficits. In addition, exported products constitute the goods and resources that an 
exporting nation could have otherwise consum ed or utilised itself. Thus, maintaining net 
private savings when the central government is operating a budget surplus comes at a 
significant opportunity cost. 
Many economists would respond by saying that a nation that exports more than it imports 
would not be rendering itself worse off because it is the  utility associated with the goods 
being traded  that matters. Presumably, the  utility gained from consuming the goods  being 
imported is greater than the utility foregone from having exported useful  goods. If not, the 
economic welfare enjoyed by a net -exporting nation  would decline and  international trade 
would, in this case, be a pointless exercise.   12 
Unfortunately, matters related to international trade are rarely straightforward. To begin 
with, international trade is conducted by individual persons and organisations, not nations, 
who, by exporting, may forego some utility in the present to maintain net savings that can be 
used to purchase goods and services in the future. In this sense, the foregone utility in the 
present represents the cost that individuals are willing to incur to accommodate their net 
savings desires. Of course, there is a limit to how far individuals will go when doing this – 
they will only incur the cost (foregone present benefits) if it remains lower than the present 
value of the benefits of any future consumption financed by the current savings. Moreover, it 
is a cost that could be avoided if the central government was prepared to run a budget deficit 
sufficient in magnitude to accommodate the private-sector‟s net savings desires.  
How  does  a  central  government  circumvent  this  cost  when  its  spending  involves  the 
private-sector transfer of something real to the central government – i.e., the handing over to 
the central government of natural resources or final goods and services or the offering of 
labour and capital? It does so by returning, often freely, the real stuff under its control in the 
form of useful goods and services. Thus, unlike exporting, real stuff is not transferred to and 
enjoyed  by  foreigners.  Consequently,  a  nation‟s  citizens  are  not  required  to  forego some 
utility in the present to have their net savings desires accommodated.
13 
This raises the question as to whether it is worthwhile at all for a nation to net export. I 
will not go into the full details here, but it is my contention that net-exporting (mercantilism) 
makes little sense when a nation‟s central government, armed with unlimited spending power, 
cannot only match the net-import spending of foreigners, but can direct its spending in such a 
way as to freely distribute much-needed goods to the nation‟s poorest citizens. A case in point 
is China. For all its massive GDP growth of late, its citizens consume a smaller-than-usual 
proportion  of  the  nation‟s  real  output.
14  Why  would  the  Chinese  Government  want  poor 
Chinese workers employed in the production of plasma-screen televisions for the benefit of 
rich-country consumers when these workers could be put to use by the Chinese Government 
to provide quality housing, food, education, and health facilities to a large number of needy 
Chinese citizens?
15 In view of the low wages being paid to many Chinese workers engaged in 
China‟s export industries, a well-targeted spending programme by the Chinese Government 
aimed at replacing net-export spending would result in little if any loss of real GDP. Nor 
would it result in any loss of employment and productive capacity, which would be better 
catered to meet China‟s needs. In addition, the ability to accommodate the net savings desires   13 
of Chinese citizens would not be compromised. In all, net-exporting is a defective means of 
furthering a nation‟s economic development.
16 
Secondly, the mutual benefits of international trade rest entirely on the presumption that 
international  trade is  governed by the principle of comparative advantage, which is itself 
premised on the immobility of capital and balanced trade. Find any macroeconomics textbook 
and  it  will  explain  how  two  nations  can  be  rendered  better  off  by  trading  in  goods  and 
services where they respectively enjoy a comparative advantage. By comparative advantage, 
economists mean the competitive advantage enjoyed by a nation in terms of the relative rather 
than absolute cost of production. Almost without exception, a nation with an absolute cost 
advantage  over  another  in  the  production  of  all  goods  and  services  will  only  enjoy  a 
comparative  cost  advantage  over  the  same  nation  in  the  production  of  some  goods  and 
services.  Because  of  this,  countries  are  encouraged  by  economists  to  specialise  in  the 
production of goods and services where they enjoy a comparative advantage and exchange 
some of them for goods and services where they have a comparative disadvantage. 
What is often overlooked with this argument is that the capacity of nations to exploit the 
benefits of comparative advantage depends on the inability of capitalists to readily relocate 
capital across international borders. If capital is highly mobile, capitalists are incentivised to 
shift their capital to low-cost production sites, where, instead, international trade is governed 
by the principle of absolute advantage (Daly and Cobb, 1989; Ekins et al. 1994; Daly, 1996; 
Lawn,  2007).
17  This latter scenario is exactly what occurs at present and is the defining 
feature of globalisation  – the integration of many national economies into a single global 
economy  through  free  trade  and  free  capital  mobility  (Daly,  2007). This  stands in  direct 
contrast  to  internationalisation  –  which  largely  existed  up  to  1971  –  where  national 
economies not only existed as separate and autonomous entities tied together in recognition of 
the importance of international trade, treaties, and alliances, but where people residing within 
nations  were  viewed  as  a  community  of  citizens  rather  than  a  collection  of  individual 
consumers, and where the mobility of capital was considerably limited. As a consequence of 
the  latter  condition,  international  trade  was  essentially  governed  by  the  more  desirable 
principle of comparative advantage. 
In a world economy that has become progressively globalised over the past three to four 
decades,  firms  in  rich  countries  have  increasingly  relocated  their  operations  off-shore  to 
exploit the cheaper natural resources and lower labour and environmental compliance costs in 
poor nations – a shift known as „industrial flight‟. It is the threat of industrial flight that often   14 
forces governments to introduce inadequate regulations, avoid them altogether, or weaken 
those already in existence. A good example is climate change, where there is considerable 
concern about the potential impact that a carbon price could have on local industries.  
Many ecological economists believe that the forces of globalisation are leading to a global 
„race to the bottom‟, which is manifesting itself in the form of downward pressure on wages, 
conditions of employment, and environmental standards, and which is allowing and indeed 
compelling many corporations to exploit profit opportunities that are often detrimental to the 
new host country and its trading partners. Ecological economists have therefore called for 
urgent institutional reform at the international level – in particular, reform of the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organisation (WTO). They believe that 
reforms should be aimed, firstly, at limiting the mobility of international capital to the extent 
needed to ensure balanced trade, which would restore comparative advantage as the principle 
governing international trade. Secondly, they believe that nations should be able to levy green 
tariffs,  subject  to  WTO  approval,  which  would  prevent  corporations  from  obtaining  a 
competitive  advantage  by  operating  in  countries  that  permit  the  over-exploitation  and 
unsustainable use of natural resources (Daly, 1996, 2007; Lawn, 2007). 
With regards to limiting the mobility of international capital, a so-called IMPEX system of 
exchange  rate  management  has  recently  been  proposed  (Iggulden,  1996;  Lawn,  2007). 
Without going into any great detail, the IMPEX system would be overseen by a revamped 
IMF.  Each  participating  nation  would  have  its  own  IMPEX  facility  that  would  operate 
independently  and  be  managed  as  a  sub-branch  of  its  central  bank.  All  international 
transactions in and out of a country would pass the through its IMPEX facility. Exporters 
would be required to exchange the foreign currency they earn into domestic IMPEX dollars 
that  would  only  come  into  existence  as  a  consequence  of  the  exportation  of  goods  and 
services.
18 Exporters would then be free to exchange the IMPEX dollars into the domestic 
currency.  The  domestic  IMPEX  dollars  would  subsequently  be  available  to  would -be 
importers who would be compelled to purchase IMPEX dollars to obtain the foreign currency 
needed to purchase foreign goods. Domestic IMPEX dollars would not be available to foreign 
nationals. Should exports be high in a particular country and the demand for imports initially 
low, the price of the nation‟s IMPEX dollars would fall, thus making imports increasingly 
attractive.  Clearly,  the  price  of  IMPEX  dollars  in  each  country would fluctuate. So, too, 
would the exchange rates between different currencies, for as much as the IMPEX system 
would guarantee that a nation‟s total trade is balanced (i.e., importing would not be possible   15 
until IMPEX dollars became available via the exportation of goods and services), differing 
relative strengths of nations and the nature of goods and services traded would lead to trade 
imbalances between individual nations. This, in turn, would lead to the continuous market 
adjustment of exchange rates.
19 
Importantly, the IMPEX system would not regulate the total level of exporting and 
importing of a particular nation. However, because it would guarantee that a nation‟s total 
trade is balanced, then, as per equation (1), a central-government deficit would be required to 
enable the private sector to increase its net savings. A central-government surplus would, on 
the other hand, reduce net savings. 
 
6. The implications of modern monetary theory 
In what follows, some of the implications of modern monetary theory will be outlined and 
discussed.  The  failure  to  understand  the  fundamentals  of  modern  monetary  theory, 
particularly as they relate to many key areas of concern, has led most mainstream economists 
to underestimate the role that central governments can play in achieving society‟s goals – in 
particular, the three goals of ecological sustainability, distributional equity, and allocative 
efficiency which must be simultaneously resolved to achieve the broader goal of sustainable 
development. I would like to think that the following section can help to overturn this false 
underestimation. 
 
6.1 The macroallocation of resources 
The allocation of resources refers to the relative division of the incoming resource flow to the 
production and provision of various goods and services. In a strict welfare-related sense, the 
allocation of resources is efficient if it maximises the economic welfare enjoyed from all new 
goods produced and eventually consumed. In mainstream parlance, the allocation of resources 
is  viewed  from  a  microeconomic  perspective  –  namely,  how  much  of  what  particular 
resources should be allocated to produce various quantities of goods X, Y, Z, etc. In recent 
times, ecological economists believe it is also necessary to view the allocation of resources 
from a macroeconomic perspective (Daly and Farley, 2004). By this, ecological economists 
mean that it is important to consider what proportion of the incoming resource flow should be 
allocated to the public-sector provision of goods and services vis-à-vis the private sector.  
There is a very good reason for this macroeconomic perspective. A great majority of the 
goods and services provided by the public sector are infrastructural goods that are needed to   16 
maintain  a  nation‟s  productive  capacity.  Many  of  these  goods  have  public  goods 
characteristics. In addition, as explained earlier, most net-exporting countries would be better 
off by having their central governments match the net-export spending of foreigners to not 
only prevent the net loss of real resources from their shores, but to direct these resources to 
useful domestic purposes. Overall, while the efficient allocation of resources to the private 
sector  can  be  largely  left  to  market  forces,  the  macroeconomic  division  of  the  incoming 
resource flow to the private and public sectors must be made through political and democratic 
processes. 
  There are a number of factors that bias against a desirable macroallocation of resources. 
One  of  these  factors  is  the  neo-liberal  position  that  individuals  are  better  placed  than 
governments to determine what goods they want.
20 It is based on the false view that central-
government expenditure involves the spending of tax-payers‟ money – money that individuals 
would  have  otherwise  spent  themselves.  Whilst  it  is  true  that  taxation  destroys  private 
spending power, the „money‟ spent by central governments is not tax-payers‟ money. Tax 
payers do not, it must be stressed, fund any central-government spending.  
  There is little doubt that individuals are better placed to know what goods they want than 
governments, although it is interesting that anti-government protagonists rarely question the 
influence of private-sector advertising on people‟s desires. Nevertheless, what individuals 
want will always include a mixture of private and public goods. Hence, many individuals will 
be more than happy to have some of their spending power destroyed, and thus forego trivial 
private goods, to allow central governments to provide much-wanted public goods in a non-
inflationary manner. This said, neo-liberals have been very successful at convincing people 
that  spending  power  is  best  served in  their hands; that government  spending crowds  out 
private-sector investment; and that the public sector is a less-efficient provider of goods and 
services than the private sector, even though the latter has yet to be conclusively demonstrated 
(Bishop and Thompson, 1992; Brown, 1996; Martin and Parker, 1997; Estache and Rossi, 
2002; Hall and Lobina, 2005). In keeping with their „small government is best‟ philosophy, 
neo-liberals  have  been  equally  successful  in  persuading  central  governments  to  privatise 
public assets, to opt for lower tax rates instead of higher government spending as a means of 
implementing an expansionary fiscal policy, and, whenever budget surpluses occur, to pass 
some of them on in the form of tax cuts. 
  Only infrequently do textbooks make mention of the possible implications that variations 
in fiscal policy settings can have on a nation‟s economy. Yet it is unquestionably true that   17 
government  spending  and  taxation  have  vastly  different  macroeconomic  effects.  Fiscal 
expansion  via  tax  cuts  or  the  issuing  of  stimulus  cheques  triggers  a  more  immediate 
macroeconomic response than more direct increases in government spending, such as public 
works  programmes,  and  is  invariably  a  preferred  means  of  responding  to  a  severe  GDP 
downturn (e.g., the recent response by The Australian Federal Government to the Global 
Financial Crisis). There are also suggestions that tax cuts have positive incentive effects that 
boost labour productivity. 
  Although increases in output generated by personal income tax cuts can stimulate private-
sector investment in productive capital, particularly if the increase in output is viewed as a 
permanent  change,  there  is  a  tendency  for  most  of  any  increased  output  to  involve  the 
production  of  consumption  goods.  Conversely,  increased  central-government  spending  is 
invariably aimed at  augmenting the nation‟s stock of infrastructural capital, which, while 
more  lagged  in  terms  of  its  immediate  impact  on  national  output  levels,  is  often  more 
beneficial in terms of boosting a nation‟s productive capacity. It is for this reason that some 
observers believe the recent preference for tax cuts over increased government spending has 
contributed in no small part to infrastructural bottle-necks. They also believe it has adversely 
affected the long-term productive capacity of many nations. 
A greater detrimental influence on the macroallocation of resources has been the perceived 
notion  that  currency-issuing  central  governments  are budget-constrained. Even when it is 
believed  that  central  governments  have  a  key  role  to  play  in  providing  and  maintaining 
critical infrastructure and other public goods, there is the view that central governments are 
fiscally constrained in their capacity to do so. It is not uncommon to hear how wonderful it 
would  be  if  central  governments  could  spend  more  money  of  health,  education,  public 
transport, the arts, etc. if only they didn‟t have to balance the budget or restrict the deficit to a 
particular  ratio  to  GDP.  Of  course,  as  argued,  no  such  fiscal  constraint  exists.  The  real 
constraints on central governments are the scarcity of resources, the limits at any point in time 
of  a  nation‟s  productive  capacity,  and  the  extent  to  which  the  public  will  tolerate  the 
destruction of its spending power to enable central governments to perform their service-
delivery  function  in  a  non-inflationary  manner.  Whilst  the  former  limits  are  largely 
biophysical and technological, the latter is merely a social constraint played out in political 
institutions. Above all, decisions regarding the appropriate macroallocation of resources are 
essentially political, not financial. 
   18 
6.2 Achieving full employment in a non-inflationary and ecologically sustainable manner 
In  the  thirty-year  period  following  World  War  2,  virtually  all  central  governments  used 
discretionary fiscal policy in an attempt to maintain full employment. As imperfect as the 
approach was, central governments largely achieved their objective by varying their spending 
to the levels estimated to bridge the gap between the actual and full-employment levels of 
national income. To perform this function, central governments almost continuously operated 
budget deficits. In general, budget surpluses only materialised as a consequence of the large 
„tax revenues‟ automatically generated during boom times. I might add that this was achieved 
at a time (e.g., pre-1971) when central governments were subject to spending constraints that 
no  longer  exist.  Except  for  EU  nations,  central  governments  are,  at  least  from  a  fiscal 
perspective, better placed than ever to achieve and maintain full employment. 
  Unfortunately,  the  explicit  goal  of  full  employment  was  abandoned  following  the 
„stagflation‟ episode experienced by most OECD countries during the 1970s.
21 At the time, it 
was wrongly believed that persistent inflation was the consequence of demand -pull factors 
when the primary cause was cost-push factors (e.g., the 1973 and 1979 oil-price shocks and 
rapid real wage growth).
22 Because it was surmised that lower government spending was 
needed to relieve the pressure on price -inflation, it was subsequently believed that central 
governments could no longer rely on discretionary fiscal policy to maintain full employment. 
This left the door open for the monetarists to convince governments that „inflation targeting‟ 
was necessary to stabilise macroeconomic systems. According to the monetarists, inflation-
control, if complemented by a range of microeconomic reforms, would restore investor and 
consumer confidence, increase resource use efficiency and labour productivity, boost national 
output, and reduce unemployment rates. 
To control inflation, monetarists believed it was necessary to use monetary policy rather 
than fiscal policy settings, which began in earnest in the late-1970s as central governments, 
through the agency of central banks, valiantly strove to limit the growth of the money supply. 
The failure of this approach led central governments to refocus their monetary policy efforts 
towards the manipulation of interest rates. This was seen as a more achievable goal than 
money supply regulation, yet one that would still allow central banks to manipulate aggregate 
spending within the economy. To accomplish this, central banks have since employed open 
market operations to keep the rate of price-inflation within a desirable target band (2-3% per 
annum). In circumstances where aggregate spending is weak, central banks are expected to 
lower interest rates in order to boost demand, facilitate increases in national output, and lower   19 
unemployment.  Should,  as  intended,  real  GDP  subsequently  grow  strongly  for  a  period, 
central banks are expected to quell any emerging inflationary pressures by raising interest 
rates. Apart from reacting to variations in the inflation rate and other inflation-related signals 
(e.g., wages growth), the extent and direction of interest rate changes has depended largely on 
where the official unemployment rate stands in relation to the non-accelerating inflation rate 
of unemployment or NAIRU. The NAIRU represents the point at which further reductions in 
the unemployment rate causes the rate of price-inflation to rise above the upper end of the 
desirable target band. Once the official unemployment rate falls to the NAIRU, central banks 
are  quick  to  tighten  monetary  policy  settings  to  prevent  the  emergence  of  undesirable 
inflationary pressures. 
Although  unemployment  and  inflation  rates  have  generally  been  lower  than  that 
experienced during the 1970s period of stagflation, the monetarist approach has failed to 
achieve  and  maintain  full  employment.  Indeed,  full  employment  has  not  existed  in  the 
industrialised world since the early-1970s.
23 There have, nonetheless, been many false claims 
that full employment has been achieved at  various stages over the past two decades. For 
example,  just  prior to  the recent  Global  Financial  Crisis, many economists and senior 
bureaucrats claimed that Australia‟s official unemployment rate of around 4% effectively 
amounted to full employment (The Australian, 9 and 16 August, 2007). This assertion was 
false. At the time, there were around 470,000 unemployed Australians and a further 400,000 
Australians whom were underemployed (ABS, 6202.0). By also taking account of hidden 
unemployment,  the  Centre  of  Full  Employment  and  Equity  estimated  that  the  true 
unemployment rate at this time – that is, the percentage of the labour force that would have 
been unemployed if all employed people were working the number of hours they desired – 
was approximately 8.9% (CLMI, 2010). Australia might well have been suffering from a 
skills shortage, as it continues to do, but it was certainly not suffering from a shortage of 
willing labour. The poor matching of the supply and demand for labour skills in Australia – 
often the result of inadequate or misdirected training and education resources
24 – has meant 
that the NAIRU has been much higher than necessary, thus leaving even more people on the 
unemployment scrap-heap.
25 
As for inflation-control, I believe that the „success‟ achieved over recent decades can be 
largely  attributed  to  lower  cost-push  pressures  aided  by  a  significant  shift  in  global 
manufacturing to low-wage nations and suppressed resource prices arising from the failure of 
governments to ensure resource prices reflect the full cost of resource use. A lack of properly   20 
developed pollution markets has also kept the cost of production artificially low. Whilst the 
shift  in  global  manufacturing  has  disadvantaged  many  low-wage  labourers  in  the 
industrialised  world,  and  has  been  less  beneficial  to  Third-World  labour  than  is  widely 
claimed, suppressed resource prices and the associated over-exploitation of natural capital 
assets has occurred to the detriment of future generations.
26 Thus, I believe inflation-control, 
as practiced in recent decades, has been realised at considerable and needless expense. 
Modern  monetary  theorists  believe  that  the  failure  of  monetarism  to  generate  full 
employment should be of no surprise given that its NAIRU focus inevitably results in a 
sacrificial pool of unemployed labour. Monetarists disagree by claiming that the NAIRU is a 
„natural‟ unemployment rate whereby any unemployment at the NAIRU is either frictional or 
voluntary (Brown, 1988). According to modern monetary theorists, the major shortcoming of 
the monetarists‟ argument is the assumption that labour-market clearances always lead to full 
employment. Mismatches of the supply and demand for labour skills aside, it is generally 
argued that unemployment exists either because: (a) an institutional constraint prevents the 
real wage from falling to the market clearing rate; or (b) the gap between dole payments and 
market-clearing  low  wages  is  sufficiently  small  to  provide  low-wage  workers  with  an 
incentive to permanently withdrawal their labour – that is, to voluntarily remain unemployed 
and  claim  unemployment  benefits.  If  unemployment  is  due  to  (b),  it  is  argued  that  the 
generosity of welfare payments should be reduced and the qualifying test for the receipt of 
unemployment benefits should be tightened. If unemployment is due to (a), the conventional 
solution  is  to  deregulate  labour  markets  to  facilitate  their  smooth  and  rapid  clearance. 
However, as modern monetary theorists explain, the proposed solutions to (a) and (b) ignore 
the link between labour markets and product markets (Wray, 1998; Mitchell and Mosler, 
2002; Mitchell and Muysken, 2006, 2008). It is merely assumed that employers are always 
willing and able to employ someone as long as the real wage is no greater than the marginal 
product of labour. Yet employing more labour is only worthwhile if the additional output 
generated can be sold in product markets. 
As  we  have  seen,  if  a  tax-paying  private  sector  desires  to  net  save,  and  the  central 
government runs a budget surplus, then unless net exports are sufficiently large, aggregate 
demand will be insufficient to ensure all output is sold. In these circumstances, the sale of all 
the  output  produced  by  a  fully-employed  economy  can  only  eventuate  if  the  central 
government engages in deficit-spending. In Australia‟s case, where it runs a perennial current   21 
account deficit, full employment is clearly unachievable unless the Federal Government runs 
a budget deficit.
27 
An examination of Australia‟s actual and full-employment levels of GDP shows that, since 
the mid-1970s, a continuous unemployment gap has existed (Mitchell and Muysken, 2008).
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In the twenty years prior to the mid -1970s, when something approaching full employment 
was the norm, this gap effectively did not exist. The same can be said of most  industrialised 
countries.  
Many  a  debate  has  taken  place  to  explain  the  existence  and  magnitude  of  the 
unemployment gap. Whilst it is true that factors other central -government spending have 
played their part, the indisputable fact is that insufficient spending has been the most critical. 
Since we would expect the private sector to want to maintain positive net savings, and given 
that Australia has been a persistent net -importer over recent decades, it is abundantly clear 
that Australia‟s failure to achieve and maintain full employment can be put down to the 
unwillingness  of  successive  Federal  Governments  to  maintain  budget  deficits  over  the 
business cycle. 
Monetarists are likely to respond by arguing that a central-government deficit designed to 
lower the unemployment rate below the NAIRU would lead to excessive price-inflation and 
unacceptably high interest rates. To prevent this from occurring, and to provide support for 
deficit-spending,  a  number  of  modern  monetary theorists  have ingeniously developed the 
concept of a Job Guarantee – an employer-of-last-resort policy which differs significantly to 
the  traditional  Keynesian  pump-priming  exercises  of  the  1950s  and  1960s  (Wray,  1998; 
Forstater, 2000, 2002; Mitchell and Mosler, 2001; Michell and Watts, 2002; Mitchell and 
Muysken, 2008). 
If introduced, the Job Guarantee would provide all unemployed people with jobs primarily 
designed to produce goods and services with public goods characteristics. All Job Guarantee 
workers would receive a minimum living wage. Apart from assisting central governments to 
achieve a Rawlsian-like equity goal, a minimum living wage would: (a) set a wage floor for 
the entire economy, and (b) circumvent any competition for labour with the private sector that 
would otherwise drive up wages and be cost-push inflationary. 
Because  not  all  unemployed  people  want  full-time work, a Job Guarantee programme 
would include fractional jobs. Also provided would be training and work flexibility. This 
would  induce  private-sector  employers  to  do  likewise,  thereby  allowing  governments  to 
simplify existing industrial relations regulations. The consequent increase in labour market   22 
flexibility would promote job sharing, which would reduce the need for central governments 
to facilitate increases in real GDP to achieve full employment. 
The beauty of the Job Guarantee is that it employs a NAIRU-like approach to prevent any 
runaway episodes of demand-pull inflation. How? Let‟s assume that the additional aggregate 
spending  required  to  institute  the  Job  Guarantee  begins  to  exert  some  demand-pull 
inflationary pressure. If the pressure exerted is moderate, the central government may be 
required to reduce its spending elsewhere or raise taxes, but, by and large, it can simply allow 
the  inflationary  pressure  to  reduce  private-sector  spending.  Although  this  would  reduce 
private-sector employment across a range of wage levels, it would be matched by an increase 
in the number of people employed by the Job Guarantee at the minimum living wage, thereby 
enabling full employment to be maintained at a lower level of real GDP. The spillover of 
labour from the private sector to the Job Guarantee would continue until a non-inflationary 
ratio  of  Job  Guarantee  workers  to  conventional  workers  was  reached,  where  upon  the 
stabilisation of the inflation rate would arise as a consequence of the newly engaged Job 
Guarantee workers having less spending power than when previously employed at higher, 
private-sector wages. This non-inflationary ratio of Job Guarantee workers to conventional 
workers  is  referred  to  by  Mitchell  and  Muysken  (2008)  as  a  „non-accelerating  inflation 
employment buffer ratio‟ or NAIBER. Unlike the strict NAIRU approach to inflation-control, 
the  Job  Guarantee  does  away  with  a  sacrificial  pool  of  unemployed  labour,  which  is 
unnecessary, insidious, and unjust. 
A further advantage of the Job Guarantee is that it is a more precise means of stabilising 
inflation.  This  is  because  the  conventional  NAIRU  approach  requires  central  bankers  to 
estimate the NAIRU and then estimate the appropriate interest rate to achieve it. There is 
much guess-work involved. Conversely, with the Job Guarantee, there would be no need to 
estimate the NAIBER, nor any need to determine the level of spending required to achieve it. 
The  NAIBER  would  simply  fluctuate  in  accordance  with  variations  in  private-sector 
spending. Moreover, central-government spending on the Job Guarantee would automatically 
adjust  as  either  more  unemployed  people  entered  Job  Guarantee  offices  (increased 
government spending) or as more Job Guarantee workers took up growing private-sector job 
offers (decreased government spending). Indeed, the level of spending on the Job Guarantee 
would always adjust to the exact amount required to achieve a non-inflationary form of full 
employment – no more, no less. This would not only be superior to the NAIRU approach to   23 
inflation-control,  but  would constitute a major advance over the imprecise pump-priming 
exercises of the Keynesian era. 
As an ecological  economist,  I have been concerned about  the  ecological sustainability 
implications of the Job Guarantee. After all, if a nation is situated on an ecological precipice, 
a  Job  Guarantee  would  initially  increase  real  GDP  and  tip  a  nation‟s  economy  into 
unsustainable territory.
29 At first blush, it would seem that the Job Guarantee is inconsistent 
with achieving ecological sustainability. This need not be the case. One of the policies 
recommended  by  ecological  economists  to  achieve  ecological  sustainability  is  a 
comprehensive cap-auction-trade system to keep the rate of resource throughput within the 
ecosphere‟s sustainable carrying capacity (i.e., within the regenerative and waste assimilative 
capacities  of  the  natural  environment).  Should  such  a  policy  be  in  place,  it  would  be 
impossible  for  the  demand  stimulus  generated  by  the  Job  Guarantee  to  translate  into  an 
unsustainable  level  of  real  GDP because the intensity of resource throughput  required to 
produce the nation‟s real output would, as a consequence of the caps, be restricted to the 
maximum  sustainable  rate.  Since  the  aim  of  the  cap-auction-trade  system  is  to  compel 
resource  buyers  to  purchase  the  limited  number  of  resource-access  permits  periodically 
auctioned by a government  authority, the demand stimulus would simply increase permit 
prices. This, in turn, would increase the cost of resource use, raise the cost of production, 
inflate goods prices, and lower real income. The fall in real income would deflate private-
sector spending and reduce private-sector employment. With a Job Guarantee in place, the 
workers laid off in the private sector would obtain Job Guarantee occupations. Thus, even in 
circumstances where ecological limits render the stimulation of aggregate demand untenable, 
the  Job  Guarantee  would  always  ration  paid  work  to  the  extent  required  to  achieve  and 
maintain  full  employment  (Lawn,  2009).  Hence,  the  Job  Guarantee  would  serve  as  an 
invaluable distributional device in an ecologically-constrained world.
30 
 
6.3 Inflation-control and central-government budgets 
Let‟s assume that a nation is generally a net importer and its private sector wishes to net save 
(e.g.,  Australia).  As  explained,  a  central-government  budget  deficit  would  be  required  to 
achieve and maintain full employment. Furthermore, if the full-employment outcome was 
achieved through the introduction of a Job Guarantee, it would be one consistent with an 
acceptable level of price-inflation. This leads to an important conclusion. Should undesirable 
inflationary pressures not arise until the nation‟s output reaches the full-employment level,   24 
and should the full-employment level of national income necessitate deficit-spending on the 
part of the central government, then the point at which no additional tax impost is required to 
nullify demand-pull inflationary pressures must be one that leaves the central-government 
budget in deficit. 
  It is therefore instructive to consider the change in circumstances for a nation if, with a Job 
Guarantee in place and its income at the full-employment level, private-sector spending rises. 
The boost in private-sector spending would lead to new private-sector employment offers at 
above-minimum  wages  which would presumably be taken up by Job Guarantee workers. 
Central-government spending would consequently decline. As such, the point at which no 
further  tax  impost  would  be necessary to  quell demand-pull inflationary pressures  would 
coincide with a smaller central-government deficit. Thus, for people in the private sector who 
find budget deficits distasteful, the message is clear and simple – increase your spending. 
 
6.4 Taxation as a policy instrument – Ecological tax reform (ETR) 
From a macroeconomic perspective, we have seen that central-government taxation does not 
finance  government  spending  but  serves  as  an  inflation-quelling  device.  Given  the 
macroeconomic  need  to  impose taxes,  some economists believe that central  governments 
should choose from the range of tax options available to achieve other policy goals. Taxes 
constitute  a  powerful  policy  instrument  because,  as  a  means  of  destroying  private-sector 
spending power, they can be used by governments to discourage undesirable activities or so-
called „bads‟. 
It is becoming increasingly apparent that a large proportion of today‟s most disconcerting 
bads  are  ecologically-related  –  a  consequence  of  the  open-access  feature  of  the  natural 
environment. At the same time, many desirable outcomes, such as the employment of willing 
labour, income generation, and the production of better quality goods are being discouraged 
by the over-taxing of labour, earned income, and value-adding in production. For this reason, 
many economists have long been calling for ecological tax reform (ETR), which essentially 
involves the imposition of taxes on resource depletion and pollution and a reduction in tax 
rates on labour and earned income (Daly, 1996; O‟Riordan, 1997; Roodman, 1998; Hoerner 
and Bosquet, 2001; Schöb, 2005). 
In  most  cases,  ETR  is  promoted  as  a  revenue-neutral  means  of  achieving  a  range  of 
environmental  and  social  goals.
31  In  reality,  the  impact  of  ETR  on  tax  revenue,  or 
equivalently, on the amount of private -sector spending power destroyed, is unpredictable   25 
since it depends on the success or otherwise of ETR measures. For example, if the decline in 
resource depletion and pollution induced by environmental taxes is greater than forecast, the 
amount of private-sector spending power destroyed would be less than expected. Hence, there 
would be a need for the central government to: (a) increase other tax rates if it wants to 
maintain revenue neutrality; or (b) reduce its spending, which, if a Job Guarantee is in place, 
would  automatically  occur  as  private-sector  spending  increased.  That  said,  the  lack  of  a 
central-government  budget  constraint  means  that  tax-revenue  neutrality  is  altogether 
irrelevant. 
Ecological economists are comfortable with the idea that conventional ETR measures can 
have positive social and employment implications (Victor, 2008). As such, they believe that 
tax reductions on labour and earned income should remain an essential feature of any ETR 
package. They are, however, much less confident that the depletion/pollution tax element of a 
conventional  ETR  approach  can  bring  about  ecological  sustainability  (Daly,  1992,  2007; 
Lawn, 2007). These misgivings stem from the argument that sustainability is essentially a 
resource throughput problem, yet the beneficial function of market prices, and this includes 
tax-adjusted resource prices, is strictly confined to improving the efficiency with which a 
given rate of resource throughput is allocated to alternative product uses. 
There is no doubt that a more efficient allocation of natural resources is socially desirable 
with obvious environmental benefits per unit of economic activity. The problem, according to 
ecological economists, is that any efficiency gains secured in an economic system devoid of 
an explicit limitation on the rate of resource throughput are likely to be overwhelmed by the 
scale effect of increased economic activity. Should this occur, the aggregate rate of resource 
throughput and any subsequent environmental stress increases rather than diminishes. This is 
often  referred  to  as  the  „Jevons‟  effect‟  (Jevons,  1865;  Blake,  2005).
32  Because  the 
conventional ETR approach does not involve an explicit limitation on the rate of  resource 
throughput, ecological economists argue that conventional ETR measures cannot prevent the 
intensity of environmental stress from eventually exceeding the ecosphere‟s carrying capacity. 
To achieve ecological sustainability, ecological economists believe it is necessary for an 
ETR package to include a separate policy instrument in the form of quantitative throughput 
controls, which must be based on ecological rather than economic criteria (Daly, 1991; Lawn, 
2000, 2007). Ecological economists are therefore in favour of tradeable resource use and 
pollution permits – essentially „cap-auction-trade‟ systems – rather than direct depletion and 
pollution taxes.
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How  do  cap-auction-trade  systems  successfully  deal  with  the  sustainability  issue  in  a 
manner that depletion/pollution taxes cannot? As alluded to earlier, a restriction (cap) on the 
number of permits auctioned by a government authority limits the rate of resource throughput 
to  one  that  is  within  the  regenerative  and  waste  assimilative  capacities  of  the  natural 
environment. This immediately resolves the sustainability goal.
34 In addition, the price paid 
by resource buyers and polluters for the limited number of permits, which is determined by 
demand and constrained supply forces in the various resource and pollution markets, serves 
as a throughput tax to facilitate the efficient allocation of the incoming resource flow.
35 As an 
added bonus, the private-sector spending power destroyed by the sale of permits allows a 
central  government to reduce tax burdens on the poor, thus enabling it to r edistribute 
spending  power  in  an  effort  to  resolve  society‟s  equity  goals.  All  up,  cap-auction-trade 
systems achieve everything that is likely to be generated by depletion and pollution taxes 
except they go one step further and ensure ecological sustainability. 
One  of  the  major  criticisms  of  cap-auction-trade  systems  vis-à-vis  depletion/pollution 
taxes is the belief that permit prices would fluctuate wildly, whereas taxes can be maintained 
at constant rates for as long as desired. Critics of cap-auction-trade systems argue that the 
former  is  not  conducive  to  private-sector  investment  or  the  development  and  uptake  of 
resource-saving  and  pollution-reducing  technologies.  A  case  in  point  is  the  growing 
preference for a carbon tax over an emissions-trading system to deal with climate change 
(e.g., Hansen, 2010).  
I  have  a  real  problem  with  this  criticism.  Firstly,  ecological  sustainability  demands 
quantity certainty and this, as argued, cannot be achieved with taxes. Secondly, the efficient 
allocation of a sustainable resource flow demands price flexibility which, again, cannot be 
achieved  with  taxes.  Both  are  facilitated  by  cap-auction-trade  systems.  Finally,  robust 
investment is not dependent upon stable prices. Investment decisions in most industries are 
based on projected price trends, not on day-to-day price fluctuations. In any case, should 
permit prices fluctuate violently in the short-term, the variation in the destruction of private-
sector spending power is automatically dealt with by a Job Guarantee. 
Consider,  then,  the  introduction  of  an  emissions-trading  system  where  a  government 
authority announces that it will progressively tighten the emissions cap and where it has been 
estimated that the total demand for permits is likely to remain steady. Despite possible short-
term fluctuations, the price of permits would generally rise over time, which would gradually 
increase the cost of polluting. This would induce investment in pollution-reducing measures   27 
and increase the efficiency with which a sustainable rate of resource throughput – guaranteed 
by the cap – is allocated. All other arguments against cap-auction-trade systems, such as 
logistical  complexity,  vulnerability  to  corruption,  and  measurement  and  monitoring 
difficulties apply equally to tax systems. 
I mentioned that there is a tendency for central governments to over-tax earned income. It 
is my belief that „unearned‟ income should not only be taxed, but, where feasible, should be 
completely confiscated. Unearned income usually exists in the form of an economic rent, 
which  constitutes  the  difference  between  the  payment  received  for  the  sale  of  natural 
resources, labour, capital, or final goods and services and the minimum payment required for 
each to be supplied in the market. Retention of economic rents is unjust and contributes to the 
inequitable distribution of income and wealth. What‟s more, economic rents fuel destabilising 
asset-price bubbles and encourage unproductive forms of investment. 
Economic rents invariably have a scarcity-related foundation, which is why they often 
apply to natural resources and certain forms of labour. Economic rents associated with natural 
resources can be captured by the cap-auction-trade systems previously outlined. As for labour, 
ecological economists believe that maximum income limits should be introduced on the basis 
that any income received above a certain level is equivalent to an economic rent.
36 They 
suggest that the maximum should be set at the salary of the Prime Minister or President of 
most  Western  democracies  or  a t  a  reasonable  order -of-magnitude  difference  above  the 
minimum wage (Pizzigati, 1992; Daly, 1996).
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Some observers stress that maximum income limits stifle effort and incentive. There is no 
reason for this. Provided maximum income limits exist at the point  where economic rents 
emerge, there ought to be no disincentive effect since the continued supply of a production 
factor, once the minimum supply price has been received, is the defining condition of an 
economic rent. Should the setting of a maximum income   limit lead to the widespread 
withdrawal of labour or any other factor of production, it simply indicates that the limit is too 
low and should be adjusted upwards. 
 
6.5  Controlling  inflation  at  the  margin  –  via  changes  in  interest  rates,  taxation,  or 
government spending? 
It should now be evident that there are three main ways that a central government can quell 
demand-pull  inflationary  pressures.  It  can:  (a)  call  upon  the  central  bank  to  manipulate   28 
interest rates on its behalf; (b) alter the tax impost on the private sector (i.e., alter the amount 
of private-sector spending power it destroys); and/or (c) vary its own spending.
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  Which of these should be used to precisely control inflation at the margin? Let‟s consider 
each more closely, starting with interest rates. It has already been pointed out that interest rate 
modifications,  via  changes  in  monetary  policy  settings,  are  a  very  imprecise  means  of 
controlling inflation. Apart from having to estimate the appropriate interest rate and its impact 
on private-sector spending, the impact is often lagged and rarely consistent throughout the 
economy  (i.e.,  some  sectors  are  more  sensitive  to  interest  rate  changes  than  others).  In 
addition to this, some observers are critical of the indiscriminate way in which monetary 
policy  affects  private-sector  spending  power.  Increases  in  the  rates  of  foreclosure  and 
bankruptcy that follow interest rate hikes serve as ample evidence that the burden of tight 
monetary  policy  settings  is  disproportionately  borne  by  the  most  vulnerable  members  of 
society – namely, small-businesses owners and low-paid workers with home mortgages. 
  As for taxation, here, too, is a problem of imprecision. A central government must not only 
consider what taxes should be adjusted, but what the tax rate should be in each instance. 
Moreover,  this  must  be  considered  in  the  knowledge  that  the  amount  of  private-sector 
spending power ultimately destroyed by taxation is influenced by the automatic stabiliser 
effect of many taxes. Clearly, if a central government is relying upon taxation to precisely 
control inflation at the margin, it will have little option but to continuously adjust tax rates. 
Because the size and direction of the adjustments cannot be a priori known, it would be 
impossible to predict the impact of taxation policy on future market prices. Unlike a well-
announced cap-auction-trade system, this would be highly destabilising. On the positive side, 
taxation is a more discriminate instrument than interest rate changes. Furthermore, as we have 
seen in relation to ecological tax reform, taxation can be targeted to achieve other policy 
objectives.  
  The  pros  and  cons  of  controlling  inflation  through  measured  changes  in  central-
government spending are similar to those applicable to taxation. On this occasion, a central 
government must determine what area of government spending should be altered and by how 
much. Although there is considerable discretion over what forms of government spending can 
be varied, the multiplier effect on private-sector spending is difficult to estimate. In addition, 
the  inflation-controlling  influence  of  a  given  change  in  government  spending  can  differ 
depending upon its impact on individual markets. Where a rise or fall in central-government 
spending noticeably alters the demand for labour, capital, or natural resources in markets that   29 
are already tight, the inflationary/deflationary influence of a change in government spending 
would be much greater than where such markets are loose.  
With this in mind, if a nation‟s economy is in deep recession, an increase in government 
spending is unlikely to drastically tighten labour and capital markets because both types of 
markets  would  be  respectively  characterised  by  idle  labour  and  underutilised  capital. 
However, if the resource throughput needed to generate the depressed level of real GDP 
already  exists  at  the  maximum  sustainable  rate,  and  a  comprehensive  cap-auction-trade 
system is introduced to ensure ecological sustainability, an increase in central-government 
spending would almost certainly trigger an inflationary episode. What this indicates, but is 
often overlooked, is that the point where cost-push inflationary pressures are likely to emerge 
throughout the economy is largely determined by the most limiting factor of production, since 
it is the most limiting factor of production that determines a nation‟s „sustainable‟ potential 
output level (Boulding, 1990).
39 The limiting factor will not always be the supply of willing 
labour, as is often assumed. This means that cost-push inflationary pressures can emerge well 
before real GDP reaches the full -employment level. Having said this, potential cost -push 
pressures are rarely reflected adequately by price signals, particularly when the limiting factor 
is the ecosphere‟s regenerative and waste assimilative capacities, because markets continue to 
understate the full cost of natural resource use and pollution. 
Assuming there is government intervention to help markets better reflect pollution and 
resource use costs, it is still possible for changes in central-government spending to control 
inflation at the margin. However, the possibility depends upon the introduction of a self-
adjusting mechanism like the Job Guarantee. As explained earlier, the Job Guarantee involves 
the hiring of labour at the minimum wage. If introduced, the Job Guarantee would circumvent 
any  inflationary  pressure  that  might  emerge  in  labour  markets.  It  is  true  that  the  Job 
Guarantee  would  not  circumvent  any  inflation-inducing  price  rises  that  might  emerge  in 
natural  resource  and  pollution  markets.  Nevertheless,  any  workers  made  redundant  as  a 
consequence  of  reduced  private-sector  spending  caused  by  ensuing  inflationary  pressures 
would be redeployed by the Job Guarantee at the minimum wage. This would continue until 
the NAIBER was attained. Hence, the Job Guarantee would always ration paid employment 
to  the extent necessary to  render  labour the most  limiting factor  of  production. In other 
words, the Job Guarantee would always ensure that the nation‟s sustainable potential output 
level coincides with the full employment of labour.
40   30 
What can one make of all of this? Firstly, if a nation‟s rate of resource throughput is well 
within ecological limits and its economy is in recession, traditional Keynesian pump-priming 
remains a functional means of boosting real GDP to something near the full-employment 
level. Secondly, marginal variations in Keynesian-like spending are unlikely to serve as a 
means of controlling inflation with any sense of precision. Having said this, interest rate 
changes  and  taxation  adjustments  are  unlikely  to  do  so  either.  Moreover,  they  do  not 
guarantee full employment. Thirdly, central-government spending should generally reflect a 
desirable macro-allocation of resources and any need for additional spending during a deep 
recession.  Fourthly,  central-government  taxation  should  not  exceed  the  level  required  to 
nullify most of the inflationary pressure of central-government spending. Taxation should 
never be increased to „balance the budget‟ and should always be imposed in ways that can 
achieve  other  policy  goals.  Fifthly,  since  interest  rate  changes  are  an  imprecise  and 
indiscriminate  means  of  controlling  inflation,  the  central  bank‟s  target  cash  rate  should 
remain constant and be set at a rate that reflects the capacity of the nation‟s real wealth to 
sustainably  generate  a  flow  of  real  goods  and  services.  This  would  ensure  that  financial 
claims on real goods and services do not outgrow the quantity of new goods and services 
made available for sale. It also means that the target cash rate should be somewhere between 
1% and 2% (Lawn, forthcoming). Lastly, because of the automatic adjustment feature of the 
Job Guarantee, it would, if introduced, serve as the ideal means of controlling inflation at the 
margin. Hence, overall, it should be variations in central-government spending, via a Job 
Guarantee, which should be used as the prime inflation-controlling device, not interest rate 
changes or taxation. 
 
6.6 The intergenerational debate 
In more recent times, a debate has transpired over whether it will be possible for nations, like 
Australia, to sustainably and equitably meet the needs of an aging and growing population. As 
part  of  this  so-called  intergenerational  debate,  a  widespread  concern  has  emerged  as  to 
whether central governments will be able to cope with the expected rise in the pension bill 
and health and aged-care expenditures. Whilst the apprehension about the capacity of nations 
to meet the needs of an aging and growing population is legitimate, the budgetary concern is 
not. Unfortunately, the pre-occupation with the latter concern is putting at risk the capacity to 
deal adequately with the more pressing former concern.   31 
  To deal with the budgetary stress that many observers believe will emerge in the future, 
two  policy  solutions  have  been  proposed.  In  the  first  instance,  it  has  been  widely 
recommended that central governments should operate and store away budget surpluses to 
provide the additional funds they will need in coming decades. Secondly, workers have been 
increasingly encouraged to direct some of their current income into superannuation schemes. 
Apart from enabling retirees to receive a retirement income in excess of the pension, the 
second policy has been promoted on the basis that it will reduce the future taxation demands 
on tomorrow‟s working population. 
  Despite the potential benefits  that could  arise from  the first  part of the second policy 
suggestion, both policy solutions are rooted on the false premise that the intergenerational 
dilemma  is  finance-based.  Because  a  currency-issuing  central  government  has  no  budget 
constraint, it always possesses the spending power required to accommodate the financing 
needs of an aging population. It therefore makes no sense for a central government to store 
away funds it can always create for itself at any time in the future. 
  In  addition  to  this,  it  needs  to  be  recognised  that  the  future  taxation  demands on the 
working  population  are  not  necessarily  reduced  by  the  introduction  of  superannuation 
schemes. Indeed, if excessively generous, superannuation schemes can increase the future tax 
burden on the working population. To adequately explain this, we first need to understand 
why a central government must tax the working population to allow the needs of retirees to be 
adequately met. Consider the following hypothetical situation. We shall assume that: 
  everyone aged 18 years and above (18+) is a member of the labour force; 
  everyone under the age of 18 (0-17) is a dependent; 
  every member of the labour force is fully employed and the productivity of an individual 
worker is not aged-related; 
  the workforce receives, as income, the monetary value of all real output produced; 
  the workforce, which constitutes the entire private sector, spends all its untaxed income on 
the new goods and services produced – hence, if the workforce is not taxed, it purchases 
all the goods and services available for sale and its net savings desires are zero; 
  the  workforce  donates  goods  and  services  directly  to  dependents  (i.e.,  working  adults 
freely hand over goods and services to young, dependent, family members); 
  there is no foreign sector; 
  the central government neither spends nor taxes the private sector;   32 
  the central government has issued the nation‟s currency at some previous point in time, 
which is now being used as a medium of exchange; 
  banks have created additional „money‟ in the form of demand deposits (financial assets) 
which are always matched by a financial liability (loans); 
  100% of the nation‟s spending is conducted by the private sector; 
  over time, the population remains constant as does the ratio of under-18 to 18+ year-old 
citizens; 
  there are no productivity increases over time; 
  the same quantity of real output (real GDP) is produced over time; 
  aggregate demand is also constant over time; 
  there is minimal price inflation (2% per annum), which is deemed acceptable. 
 
Some time in the future, the central government introduces a pension scheme for people 
aged 65 years and above. As a consequence: 
  everyone aged 65 and above becomes a member of the non-working population; 
  everyone below the age of 65 is either a member of the working population (18-64) or 
dependent upon the working population (0-17); 
  the nation‟s real GDP declines because people aged 65+ no longer work; 
  the workforce continues to receive the monetary value of all real output produced; 
  the workforce also continues to spend its entire untaxed income on new goods and services 
produced – hence, its net savings desires remain at zero; 
  the working population directly transfers some of the goods and services its purchases to 
dependents (people aged 0-17), but does not do the same for retirees; 
  retirees depend upon a fortnightly pension received from the central government; 
  there is no other central-government spending. 
 
Because there are now more financial claims on goods and services than there are goods 
and  services  available  for  sale,  the  introduction  of  the  pension  scheme  is  potentially 
inflationary. To nullify the inflationary impact of retirees‟ spending, the central government 
must destroy some of the spending power of the working population, which it does by taxing 
them. The tax impost on the working population does not finance retirees‟ pension cheques, 
as is commonly believed, but provides the spending „room‟ for retirees to purchase goods and   33 
services  in  a  non-inflationary  manner.  If  the  central  government  has  been democratically 
elected to introduce the pension scheme, the tax impost on the working population effectively 
constitutes the political means by which the working population is compelled to „donate‟ 
some of the goods and services it produces to retirees. 
  Believing that superannuation will reduce the tax impost on the working population, the 
central government introduces a compulsory superannuation scheme. As a consequence: 
  the working population, which continues to receive the entire nation‟s money income, is 
compelled to save a small proportion of its money income to fund its future retirement 
spending (superannuation); 
  the remainder of its income is used to purchase goods and services; 
  as for retirees, they no longer receive a fortnightly pension cheque – they instead receive a 
fortnightly „super‟ cheque drawn from the savings built up over their working lives; 
  the pension scheme is scrapped and there is no central-government spending; 
  retirees, who do not contribute to the production of new goods and services, use their 
„super cheques‟ to purchase some of the new goods and services produced by the working 
population. 
 
Because the working population is now spending less than it could to build up its savings 
for retirement, some limited spending room is made available for retirees to purchase goods 
and  services  in  a  non-inflationary  manner.  Provided  the  aggregate  value  of  the  working 
population‟s net savings (superannuation contributions) equals the aggregate value of retirees‟ 
spending, there is no additional inflationary pressure in the economy. However, if the former 
exceeds the latter, there is unemployment and the central government must deficit-spend to 
return  the  economy  to  full  employment.  Conversely,  if  the  latter  exceeds  the  former,  an 
unacceptable rate of price-inflation begins to emerge. To prevent this, the central government 
must provide some additional room to facilitate the non-inflationary spending of retirees. It 
does this by destroying some of the spending power of the working population, which it 
accomplishes by taxing them. This second case is important because it disproves the claim 
that  superannuation  eliminates  all  need  for  a  central  government  to  tax  the  working 
population to enable retirees to meet their spending requirements. 
Let‟s assume that all retirees receive a super cheque rather than a pension cheque. Whether 
the working population needs to be taxed and, if so, how much, depends on the following 
factors. The first is the ratio of retirees to the working population. Ceteris paribus, if this ratio   34 
increases and the working population is already being taxed to nullify the inflationary impact 
of retirees‟ spending, the tax impost on the working population must be increased. There are 
two  main  influences  on  the  ratio  of  retirees  to  the  working  population  –  one  is  the  age 
structure of the population; the other is the average age of retirement. Should the average age 
of retirement and of the population generally both increase, the ratio will rise. 
The second factor is the size of retirees‟ fortnightly super cheques relative to the working 
population‟s fortnightly superannuation contributions. If the former increases relative to the 
latter, insufficient spending room will be available via the forced net savings of the working 
population to permit the non-inflationary spending of retirees. Once again, the tax impost on 
the working population must be increased. 
The third major factor is a nation‟s sustainable productive capacity. Clearly, if this capacity 
rises,  the  working  population  is  able  to  produce  more  goods  and  services  for  itself,  its 
dependents, and retirees. Consequently, less spending room must be created to nullify the 
inflationary impact of a given level of retirees‟ spending. As such, the tax impost on the 
working population can be reduced. 
Some people believe the first factor can be averted by increasing the birthrate or by raising 
the  minimum  retirement  age.  However,  increasing  the  birthrate  merely  postpones  the 
problem. Worse still, it leads to a growing population which, by placing greater stress on the 
natural  environment,  reduces  a  nation‟s  sustainable  productive  capacity.  Increasing  the 
retirement age can help but this raises the issue of whether people should be forced to work 
later into their lives. Many see such a proposal as a sign of regress rather than progress.  
Ultimately, it is the third factor which is most crucial. After all, living longer is considered 
desirable and so an aging population should be welcomed. Our attention must therefore focus 
on boosting a nation‟s sustainable productive capacity. To achieve this, it is necessary to 
maintain adequate investments in capital goods and critical infrastructure as well as improve 
the technology embodied within them. Appropriate investment levels are also required in the 
areas  of  education,  training,  and  health  –  in  particular,  preventative  health  measures. 
Likewise,  preservation  and  investment  in  natural  capital  is  needed  to  maintain  critical 
ecosystem services and a sustainable flow of natural resources into the economy. I might also 
add that achieving and maintaining full employment is also vital given the extent to which 
human capital can quickly depreciate when labour is left idle. Very importantly, all such 
investments need to be made both  now and into the future. What‟s more, many of these 
investments need to be undertaken by central governments.   35 
What are most central governments doing in this regard? Over the business cycle, they are 
running budget surpluses in the false belief they need to accumulate future spending power. 
Some central governments have been running large deficits, but virtually all of them have 
earmarked harsh austerity measures to reign in their „profligate‟ spending. How do they plan 
to do this? By reducing their spending on capital goods, infrastructure, education, and natural 
capital maintenance, thereby undermining the future capacity of their nations to meet the 
requirements of an aging population. 
In the end, the ability of a nation to meet the requirements of an aging population has no 
financial basis. It depends entirely upon its sustainable productive capacity – that is, on the 
ability of its workforce to utilise natural and produced capital to generate a sustainable flow 
of real goods and services. Achieving such a goal, which will minimise the future tax impost 
on  the  working  population,  requires  sufficient  on-going  public-sector  and  private-sector 
investments. The only constraints to this are technological, biophysical, cultural/behavioural, 
and political. They are not financial. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, I have demonstrated that currency-issuing central governments have no budget 
constraint.  Rather  than  fear  central-government  budget  deficits,  people  should  ignore 
mainstream and neo-liberal rhetoric and welcome the central-government use of its unique 
spending and taxing powers to achieve a range of social, economic, and environmental goals. 
Having said this, I am in no way recommending that governments should supplant the private 
sector when it comes to the production and supply of private goods in a competitive market 
environment.  Indeed, as  I have been at  pains  to  emphasise, there is still such a thing as 
excessive and irresponsible government spending which central governments should at all 
times  avoid.  But  I  would  argue  that  attempts  to  run  budget  surpluses,  as  mainstream 
economists  advocate,  generally  lead  to  excessive  and  irresponsible  levels  of  government 
taxation. Unfortunately, over the past thirty years, there has been more of the latter than the 
former.  
Inappropriate  fiscal  policy,  along  with  the  degenerative  forces  of  globalisation,  has 
resulted in a massive running down of the productive capacity of many rich nations, which 
has  left  in  its  wake  a  welfare-dependent  underclass  and  an  inability  of  many  nations  to 
produce their way out of an economic recession. Whilst deep economic recession has been 
largely avoided over the past twenty years, it has been kept at bay by a private-sector debt-  36 
fuelled consumption „binge‟ subsidised and prolonged by the importation of cheap Third-
World goods (produced by underpaid Third-World labour), over-inflated asset prices, and the 
expropriation of environmental source and sink capacity from future generations. The Global 
Financial  Crisis  and  the  problems  confronting  most  rich  nations  are  the  outcome  of 
economies  having  grown  beyond  their  sustainable  carrying  capacity  and  a  neo-liberal, 
monetarist experiment that has gone horribly and predictably wrong. Critical decisions need 
to be made very soon by central governments across the world. One of them should be the 
abandonment of monetarism and the responsible exploitation of their unique spending and 
taxing powers. As for EU countries, which have relinquished monopoly ownership of the 
national currency, the solution is a painful albeit necessary one. I don‟t expect the EU to last 
into the foreseeable future. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1   Modern  monetary  theory  is  the  term  used  to  define  and  explain  the  workings  of  a  monetary  system 
characterised by a floating exchange rate and the monopoly provision by a central government of a fiat currency 
(Mitchell and Muysken, 2008). 
2   My spending power would only be limited by the raw materials, labour, capital, and final goods and services 
available for sale. In the context of this discussion, this is a trivial issue. 
3   A couple of points. Firstly, this assumes that the cen tral government is the monopoly owner and issuer of a 
fiat currency (i.e., a currency not converted into, say, gold, as was the case with the gold standard during the 
Bretton Woods era). Secondly, there must be a flexible exchange rate in place. 
4   May I say, currency-issuing central governments do not „print money‟ in order to spend. They sometimes 
issue  cheques;  however,  in  this  computer  age,  they  predominantly  spend  by  electronically  crediting  bank 
accounts. Similarly, they electronically debit bank accounts when they tax the private sector. Currency-issuing 
central governments merely print and mint enough notes and coins to meet the cash transaction needs of the 
private sector. There is virtually no association between the quantity of cash within the economy and the size of a 
nation‟s money supply. 
5   Again, the spending power of a currency-issuing central government is limited by the raw materials, labour, 
capital, and final goods and services available for sale from the private sector. In a democracy, t he spending 
power of a  currency-issuing central government is also politically limited. That is, the electorate can eject a 
currency-issuing central government that spends on a scale that the electorate finds distasteful. 
6   Public goods are goods with two  main characteristics: (a) the non-rivalry of consumption/use; and (b) the 
non-excludability of consumption/use. Public goods are goods that can be desired and demanded by society but, 
because of their characteristics, cannot be provided in sufficient quantities by the private sector (market failure). 
7   Each country has a different term for the  short-term interest rate. The overnight cash rate is an Australian 
term. In the USA, it is referred to as the Fed funds rate; in Japan, it is referred to as the overnight call rate. 
8   Should the central bank have no cash rate   target, it would simply not act. In these circumstances, the 
overnight cash rate would fall to the default rate. This is precisely what happened in Japan in the 1980s. Despite 
large central government deficits, interest rates in Japan ef fectively fell to zero, which was the default rate on 
excess reserves. 
9   For ease of exposition, the spending and taxation of non -central governments are ignored. This leads to no 
loss of analytical insight. 
10   For example, based on equation (1), it is possible to have  -10 = 10  – 20 (i.e., budget surplus of 10; net 
savings of 10; and net exports of 20). 
11   Of course, these financial assets will be denominated in the foreign currencies acquired. 
12   This is logically determined by applying equation (1) for the rest-of-the-world, which, in the example given 
in footnote 10, would have net exports of  -20. That is, either: 20 = 0  – (-20) (i.e., budget deficit of 20; net 
savings of 0), or 0 = -20 – (-20) (i.e., balanced budget; net savings of -20). Some other combination is also 
possible with next exports of -20, but it would still require either a budget deficit or negative net savings. With 
any other combination, the budget deficit or negative net savings is simply larger in magnitude (e.g., 30 = 10 – (-
20) or -10 = -30 – (-20)). 
13   This is true in aggregate rather than at the individual level. Through redistribution, some citizens will receive 
more goods and services from the central government than other citizens. Over all, it is possible for  the goods 
and services received by a citizen from the central government – more likely a wealthy citizen – to be less than 
the quantity of goods and services foregone by having some of their spending power destroyed through taxation.   40 
                                                                                                                                                        
14   As at 2007, China‟s total consumption expenditure (public and private) constituted just 49% of its GDP. At 
the same time, the values for the USA and Australia were 87% and 75% respectively. Between 1970 and 2007, 
the lowest values for the USA and Australia were 79% and 69% respectively. As for China, its value of 49% in 
2007 was fractionally higher than the lowest value achieved during the 1970-2007 period, which was 48% in 
2006. The ratio of China‟s total consumption to GDP peaked at 73% in 1972. Data sourced from the World 
Bank (see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.GOV.ZS). 
15   As at 2005, 36% of the Chinese population earned less than $US2 per day. 
16   Some people would respond by saying that the increased production in China has occurred bec ause of the 
vast foreign investment by transnational corporations. True, but the Chinese Government could always favour 
foreign investment by corporations producing goods and capital needed by China, which it could do by using its 
spending power to finance suitable tendering contracts. It could also provide low-interest or no-interest loans to 
Chinese entrepreneurs to establish new and much-needed Chinese enterprises. The source of the poverty data is 
the World Bank (see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS). 
17   Many  observers  continue  to  use  the  term  „comparative  advantage‟  when  referring  to  contemporary 
international trade issues and concerns. In the process, they reveal their ignorance, since they never argue that a 
country should continue to produce and perhaps export particular goods because it produces some of them at a 
lower relative cost than other nations. They always argue that a nation should only continue to produce particular 
goods if they produce them at a lower absolute cost. Hence, they talk in terms of absolute advantage but refer to 
it as comparative advantage. These observers need to revisit their textbooks. 
18   Because one nation must import goods and services to enable another to export goods and services, if every 
nation introduced the IMPEX system, there would be no trade, since no nation could import prior to exporting. 
To overcome this potential stalemate, a small quantity of IMPEX dollars would need to be made available 
upfront by the respective IMPEX facilities in each participating country. 
19   It has been suggested that the IMPEX system would reduce if not eliminate exchange rate variations arising 
out of currency speculation. 
20   I mean „liberal‟ in the British and Australian tradition, which contrasts significantly from the American view 
of liberalism. 
21   Stagflation consists of a persistently high inflation rate and unemployment rate  – the latter  of which is 
generally the product of sluggish GDP growth. 
22   It was estimated that, in Australia in the 1970s, the real wage o verhang (i.e., the extent to which real wages 
had outgrown the productivity of labour) was in the order of 5-10% (Norris, 1989). 
23   The only real exception was Japan in the late-1970s and early-1980s. 
24   The decline in Australia of trade-related apprenticeships, the ridding of technical high schools, and the blind 
desire of the Federal Government to increase university participation regardless of social requirements has also 
played a part in this mismatch. The mismatch is now being inadequately dealt with b y a policy of issuing 
temporary work visas for suitably skilled foreigners. 
25   The NAIRU is higher because a shortage of labour with specific skills and qualifications leads to wage rises 
in some labour markets despite the existence of surplus and unwanted labour in other labour markets. The excess 
wage pressure leads to accelerated price inflation that, under present arrangements, demands a tight monetary 
policy response from the central bank. 
26   It is often claimed that globalisation has dragged many peop le in the Third World out of poverty. What is 
often overlooked is that this emergence from poverty merely refers to people whose incomes have risen above 
US$2 per day. Whilst this is preferable to incomes below US$2 per day, to enjoy higher incomes, many p eople 
must now endure longer working hours and poor working conditions. Moreover, to obtain employment, many 
people have been forced to uproot themselves from their communities. This has not only been socially 
disruptive, it has reduced the self -sufficiency of many rural communities. In numerous cases, the increase in 
output that has increased incomes has come at an enormous environmental cost  – something that not only 
threatens the long-term viability of employment and associated incomes, but also the health of many people in 
so-called developing nations. The increased social and environmental cost of globalisation is rarely contrasted 
against the increase in Third-World wages and incomes. The image of the progress emanating from increased 
globalisation is therefore considerably distorted (see Lawn and Clarke, 2008). 
  To make matters worse, much of what is produced by Third World labour is eventually consumed in the First 
World, of which the latter is willing to pay reasonable prices to obtain. Although low-paid work in Third World 
countries is often low-skilled work, there is little doubt in my mind that Third World workers are being paid 
wages well below the marginal value product of their labour. Consequently, there is also no doubt in my mind 
that  globalisation  amounts  to  the  Third  World  subsidisation  of First World consumption and recent wealth 
accumulation and has played no small part in the „relative‟ success of First World nations since the mid-1970s.   41 
                                                                                                                                                        
27   This  reasoning  also  helps  one  to  understand  why,  in  Australia,  household  debt  reached  monumental 
proportions during the previous Liberal-National Coalition Government‟s final term, and why the attainment of a 
low unemployment rate (though never full employment) was dependent upon the rise in household debt. At this 
time,  the  Coalition  Government  ran  budget  surpluses,  the  private  sector  obviously  did  not  wish  to  rigidly 
maintain its net savings, and the current account was in deficit. Clearly, for Australia‟s national spending to be of 
the level required to keep unemployment low, the private sector had to go increasingly into debt, which was 
unsustainable. Interestingly, when the Rudd Labor Government issued stimulus cheques in the early stages of the 
Global Financial Crisis, it was estimated that quite a large proportion of the spending power issued was used by 
the  private  sector  to  reduce  its  debt.  It  did  so,  not  only  because  it  made  sense  to  retire  some  of  the  debt 
accumulated  during  the  reign  of  the  Coalition  Government,  but  because  the  deficit  spending  of  the  Rudd 
Government meant the private sector could now do so without having to drastically reduce its own spending. 
28   Computation of the unemployment gap is based on the achievement of a steady unemployment rate requiring 
real GDP to equal the sum of labour force expansion and the growth in labour productivity, other things equal. 
29   It is important to recognise that goods and services are not made  from labour and capital, but by labour and 
capital.  As  the  resource-transforming  agents  of  the  production  process,  labour  and  capital  cannot  produce 
anything without the prior input of natural resources (low-entropy matter-energy). Thus, any attempt to increase 
real GDP to boost employment levels must result in the use of more natural resources. Claims that services can 
be provided without having to increase resource use are false (see Daly, 2007; Lawn, 2009). 
30   Some observers would no doubt object to the idea of a portion of the labour force being „forced‟ out of the 
private sector and into a lower-paid Job Guarantee occupation (i.e., the NAIBER would initially be higher than 
the NAIRU). This is a potentially undesirable aspect of the Job Guarantee. However, consider the following. 
Firstly, having some people employed on a lower income is more equitable than having a great deal more people 
permanently unemployed under a NAIRU policy stance. Secondly, the higher resource costs induced by a cap-
auction-trade  system  would  presumably:  (a)  stimulate  the  development  and  uptake  of  resource-saving 
technology; and (b)  facilitate the allocation of the incoming resource flow to higher value-adding forms of 
production. In other words, higher resource costs would increase labour productivity over time. I believe this 
would result in the NAIBER being considerably lower than the NAIRU in the long-run, which is an undeniably 
better outcome on all fronts. 
31   In modern monetary theory parlance, this would amount to being neutral in terms of its destruction of 
private-sector spending power. 
32   There are many reasons why the Jevons‟ effect is likely to occur. They include: (a) thermodynamic limits to 
increased technical efficiency and materials recycling; (b) the fact that market prices only reflect the relative and 
not absolute scarcity of natural resources; and (c) currently-living people discount future values while, at the 
same time, future generations are unable to bid for resources in the present. For more, see (Daly, 1991; Lawn, 
2007; 2010). 
33   A more detailed description of a system of tradeable permits can be found in Lawn (2007), Chapter 11. 
34   There is much  more to achieving ecological sustainability than restricting the rate of resource throughput. 
Other requirements, such as maintaining adequate biodiversity levels, would also have to be met, although these 
will all be futile if the rate of throughput is unsustainable. Many of these additional requirements are outlined in 
Lawn (2007). 
35   It is the constraint on supply forces that ensures ecological limits, not just ecological costs, are internalised 
into resource prices. 
36   Income received above the maximum limit would be taxed at a 100% rate. 
37   Some have suggested that this order -of-magnitude difference should not exceed ten times the minimum 
income (e.g., Pizzigati, 1976), which is similar to the difference between the w ages of CEOs and lowest-paid 
company employees in the 1950s. 
38   It is true that private-sector spending can be influenced by a changing exchange rate. However, exchange 
rates cannot be easily manipulated by central governments because exchange rates are heavily influenced by the 
speculative buying and selling of currencies on foreign-exchange markets. Also, the buying back of the domestic 
currency by selling foreign currencies is limited by the holdings of foreign-currency stocks. 
39   By  „sustainable‟  potential  output  level,  I  mean  the  maximum  output  level  that  a  nation  can  potentially 
produce from the maximum sustainable rate of resource throughput. 
40   It should be noted that the more ecologically unsustainable is the current level of real GDP, the greater is the 
need to ration paid employment to achieve  a non-inflationary form of full employment , which would mean 
having more people employed on the Job Guarantee. 